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THE CHARGING ORDER UNDER THE UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT
J. GORDON GOSE*
One of the most artificial and confusing procedures of the common
law was the method by which the creditor of a partner enforced his
claim against the interest of his debtor in the partnership. Lord Justice
Lindley of the English Court of Appeal, a most eminent authority on
the law of partnership, aptly describes the common law procedures in
the following language:
When a creditor obtained a judgment against one partner and he wanted
to obtain the benefit of that judgment against the share of that partner in
the firm, the first thing was to issue a ft. fa., and the sheriff went down to
the partnership place of business, seized everything, stopped the business,
drove the solvent partners wild, and caused the execution creditor to bring
an action in Chancery in order to get an injunction to take an account and
pay over that which was due by the execution debtor. A more clumsy
method of proceeding could hardly have grown up.'
Substantially the same procedure prevailed throughout the United
States under general execution statutes where the successive steps gen-
erally consisted of: (1) seizure of some or all of the partnership prop-
erty under writ of execution; (2) sale of the debtor partner's "interest
in the property"; (3) acquisition of the debtor partner's interest "in
the property" by the purchaser at the execution sale, subject, however,
to the payment of partnership debts and prior claims to the firm against
the debtor partner; (4) compulsory dissolution and winding up of the
partnership, and (5) distribution to the execution purchaser of the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
I Brown, Janson & Co. v. Hutchinson & Co., 1 Q.B. 737 (1895).
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debtor partner's share of any property remaining after the winding up
process was completed.'
Two factors combined to bring about this "clumsy method." The
first was the difficulty which courts and lawyers had in understanding
the nature of a partner's interest in a partnership, that is, that it was
an intangible share in the business of the firm rather than a direct
interest in the property of the firm. Even when this concept was recog-
nized, as it inevitably was when a separate creditor of a partner seized
partnership property, the second factor came into play. The common
law had no procedure for the seizure of the partner's intangible interest
in the business. The writ of leri jaclas, common law counterpart of
the writ of execution, permitted seizure of physical property only.8
Since it was practically inconceivable that valuable partnership inter-
ests should be exempt from creditors' claims,' the writ of fieri jacias
was employed even though ill suited to the purpose.
We thus find the common law courts enforcing claims against an
intangible interest by a procedure commencing with the seizure of
property but in its later stages converted into a proceeding whereby the
debtor's beneficial interest in the business is made available to his
creditor. The final result, however, could be attained only at the ex-
pense of the disruption of the business and the compulsory dissolution
of the partnership. These consequences were not only unfair to the
non-debtor partners but also harmful to the value of the partnership
interest which the creditor sought to reach in that good will and going
concern value might be impaired or destroyed. In this state of affairs
it was inevitable that a demand for reform arose.
In the United States such reform measures as were adopted prior
to the Uniform Partnership Act took a variety of forms, which in the
main afforded only partial relief. The Texas statute, for example, pro-
vided for a smbolic seizure of the partner's interest by exhibiting a
copy of the writ of execution at the partnership place of business,"
without any interference with the property of the partnership. Other
statutes permitted a seizure of partnership property by the sheriff but
2 This summary of the American procedure is an approximation of the prevailing
rules. As might be expected, the very artificial nature of the proceeding led to the
development of many local variations. Probably the best general description of the
American procedure is found in BURDICK, PARTNERSHIP, 269 to 281 (Third Ed., 1917).
In the words of that author (p. 270) the situation was "painfully complicated." See
also CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 43 (Second Ed., 1952) ; STORY, PARTNERSHIP, § 261 et
sreq. (Fourth Ed., 1855).
8 CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 43 (Second Ed., 1952).
4 Nixon v. Nash, 12 Ohio 647, 648 (1861).5 J. M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Owens, 161 S.W. 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
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forbade him to take the property out of the possession of the partner-
ship.' The Washington statute permitted the non-debtor partners to
retain possession on giving bond "to hold and manage the property
according to law."7 Obviously, none of these early statutes attacked
the problem directly. What wis needed was a statute giving the credi-
tor. the right to resort directly to his debtor's beneficial interest in the
partnership rather than to proceed by the wholly artificial process of
execution against an ephemeral "interest in property. ''7a
Such a statutory provision was included in the Partnership Act
adopted in England in 1890.8 The English statute was, in turn, the
model for the comparable provision of the Uniform Partnership Act
approved by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1914.
Since the two acts are in most respects identical but do have a few
significant differences the pertinent provisions of both are -set forth.
The English Ace provides:
§ 23. Procedure Against Partnership Property for a Partner's Separate
Judgment Debt.-(1) After the commencement of this Act a writ of execu-
tion shall not issue against any partnership property except on a judgment
against the firm.
(2) The High Court, or a judge thereof, or the Chancery Court of the
county palatine of Lancaster, or a county court, may, on the application by
summons of any judgment creditor of a partner, make an order charging
that partner's interest in the partnership property and profits with pay-
ment of the amount of the judgment debt and interest thereon, and may by
the same or a subsequent order appoint a receiver of that partner's. share of
profits (whether already declared or accruing), and of any other money
which may be coming to him in respect of the partnership, and direct all
accounts and inquiries, and give all other orders and directions which might
have been directed or given if the charge had been made in favor of the
judgment creditor by the partner, or which the circumstances of the case
may require.
(3) The other partner or partners shall be at liberty at any time to
redeem the interest charged, or in case of a sale being directed, to purchase
the same.
6 Dengler's Appeal, 125 Pa. 12, 17 A. 184 (1889).
7RCW 6.04.120 [RRS § 580].
"a Of the remedial statutes, the most logical appears to have been the Georgia pro-
cedure which extended the scope of the writ of garnishment to a partnership interest.
Blakeney v. Franklin, 26 Ga. App. -305, 105 S.E. 872 (1921) ; Citizens' Bank & Trust
Co. v. Pendergrass Banking Co., 164 Ga. 302, 138 S.E. 223 (1927). The usual writ of
garnishment statute does not reach an interest of this character. Home v. Petty, 192
Pa. 32, 43 At. 404 (1899).8 7 U.L.A. 256, 259.
9 Note 8, .upra.
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§ 33. Dissolution by Bankruptcy, Death, or Charge.
(2) A partnership may, at the option of the other partners, be dissolved
if any partner suffers his share of the partnership property to be charged
under this Act for his separate debt.
The Uniform Partnership Act 0 provides:
Section 25. Nature of a Partner's Right in Specific Partnership Prop-
erty....
(c)A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to
attachment or execution, except on a claim against the partnership....
Section 26. Nature of Partner's Interest in the Partnership. A partner's
interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus, and the
same is personal property.
Section 28. Partner's Interest Subject to Charging Order.-(1) On
due application to a competent court by any judgment creditor of a partner,
the court which entered the judgment, order, or decree, or any other court,
may charge the interest of the debtor partner with payment of the unsatis-
fied amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon; and may then
or later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits, and of any other money
due or to fall due to him in respect of the partnership, and make all other
orders, directions, accounts and inquiries which the debtor partner might
have made, or which the circumstances of the case may require.
(2) The interest charged may be redeemed at any time before fore-
closure, or in case of a sale being directed by the court may be purchased
without thereby causing a dissolution:
(a) With separate property, by any one or more of the partners, or
(b) With partnership property, by any one or more of the partners with
the consent of all the partners whose interests are not so charged or sold.
(3) Nothing in this act shall be held to deprive a partner of his right, if
any, under the exemption laws, as regards his interest in the partnership.
Section 31. Causes of Dissolution. Dissolution is caused: (1) Without
violation of the agreement between the partners, ...
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not assigned their
interests or suffered them to be charged for their separate debts, either
before or after the termination of any specified term or particular under-
taking....
Section 32. Dissolution by Decree of Court .... (2) On the application
of the purchaser of a partner's interest under section ... 28 (the court shall
decree a dissolution) (a) After the termination of the specified term or
particular undertaking, (b) At any time if the partnership was a partner-
ship at will ... when the charging order was issued.
A brief comparison reveals that the two statutes are substantially
identical. Both forbid the former practice of seizing partnership prop-
erty as a step in the collection of a separate debt. Both substitute for
10 7 U.L.A. 144, 158, 162, 169, 177.
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the former procedure an entirely new enforcement measure called a
"charging order" to which receivership and sale are possible incidents.
Both permit the debtor partners to dissolve the firm if they feel ag-
grieved by the existence of the charging order. The apparent points of
difference between the two statutes rest in the fact that the American
statute is somewhat more detailed and specific. It is quite probable,
however, that many if not all of the points specifically added by the
Uniform Act will be developed judicially in England as and when the
occasion requires.
The English Act has now been in effect for more than sixty years.
The Uniform Act, promulgated in 1914, was first adopted in Pennsyl-
vania in 1915 and is now the law in thirty-one states and in the Terri-
tory of Alaska." It was adopted in the state of Washington in 1945.12
There has therefore been ample time for experience with the new pro-
cedure and to warrant an iMquiry into its workability.
Judging only from the volume and content of the decided bases both
in England and the United States, the statutes have apparently worked
very well. There are in fact only two cases in England and fewer than
twenty in the United States which are directly concerned with the
charging order procedure under the statute. None of these cases raises
problems of the complexity which existed under the former procedure
and few even suggest the possible existence of difficult questions.
Other evidence, however, suggests that the paucity and serenity of
the decisions conceal a number of deficiencies in the statute, particu-
larly in the United States. Casual conversations with American judges
and lawyers reveal not only a general unfamiliarity with the statute
but also a lack of familiarity with its theory and its meaning on the
part of those who try to apply it. Such confusion is wholly under-
standable. Although the statute, when read generally with some under-
standing of its background, may appear to be satisfactory, it fairly
bristles with unanswered questions when it is closely scrutinized. In
contrast to statutes pertaining to more conventional enforcement pro-
ceedings such as executions, attachments and garnishments, the charg-
ing order statute is couched in most general terms. Neither Section 28
of the Uniform Act nor its English counterpart contains a detailed
statement of the procedure for obtaining or the consequences which
result from a charging order. The English have something of an ad-
1 7 U.L.A. (1952 Supp., p. 7).
12 RCW 25.04.010 to 25.04.430 [REL. STipp. 1945 § 9975-40 to 9975-82].
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vantage in that a "charging order" procedure is prescribed in the Judg-
ments Act of 1838.18 Although the problems of enforcement under that
act are not identical with those arising under the Partnership Act, the
terminology is familiar to English courts and lawyers and some con-
cepts of procedure were in existence when the Partnership Act became
effective. Also some procedural problems under the English Partner-
ship Act are covered by court rule.laa In the United States, however,
the "charging order" procedure was a complete innovation and none
of the procedural doubts has been squarely resolved by statute or
court rule so far as the author has been able to ascertain.
What then are the doubts and questions raised by the statute? The
more prominent ones under the Uniform Act are: What is a "compe-
tent court" empowered to issue the charging order?; 1 what consti-
tutes "due application" to the court?;18 what is the effect of a "charg-
ing order" on the creditor, the debtor partner, the non-debtor partners
and the partnership?; when and why should a receiver be appointed?;
how far should a court go in the exercise of the power to make such
other orders "which the circumstances of the case may require?";
when should a sale of the partnership interest be ordered and by whom
and in what manner should it be conducted?; what are the rights of
non-debtor partners who redeem or purchase the interest charged?;
and, finally, is the charging order procedure the exclusive remedy?
These questions are broadly divisible into problems of substance and
of procedure and will be in large part discussed under these two broad
classifications. Before entering upon that discussion, some general
observations are in order.
It is unfortunate that the Act does not provide more specific answers
to the questions listed above. It is generally true that one seeking to
enforce a judgment must move expeditiously. The situation ordinarily
does not permit the creditor's lawyer or the trial court to take the prob-
lem under advisement. If, however, counsel and the court do proceed
expeditiously, the possibility of error is substantial. Also, without
elaborate research, court and counsel may be left with the haunting
feeling that, somewhere in the statutes or in the decisions, the language
of section 28 has been construed in a manner quite different from pro-
cedure which is being employed by them. One function of this ar-
18 1 and 2 Vict., ch. 110.
S LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP, 432 (Tenth Ed.).
14 The English Act identifies the various courts by name.
15 This is covered in part by court rule in England. Note 13a, supra.
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ticle is to allay such possible doubts by reviewing the English and
American decisions under the statute. Since, however, as will appear,
the decisions make no great headway into the matter and leave many
questions unanswered, such a review, in and of itself, will for the most
part only provide some assurance of the absence of authority. There-
fore, a substantial portion of the discussion to follow will represent
the views of the author, based upon what he believes should be the
proper construction of the statute, in light of its purposes and general
structure.
THE SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS AVALABLE UNDER THE CHARGING
ORDER PROCEDURE
The first, and doubtless the most important question under the
statute, concerns the scope and effect of the charging order procedure.
Put bluntly, the question is what may the court order contain? How
does it enable the creditor to get his money?
Looking to the statute alone, four types of action are indicated:
(1) an order "charging the interest" of the debtor partner "with pay-
ment of the unsatisfied amount of (the) judgment debt"; (2) the
appointment of a "receiver of (the debtor's) share of the profits, and
of any other money due or to fall due to him in respect of the part-
nership"; (3) the making of orders for accounting or other matters
which the debtor partner might have made or "which the circumstances
of the case may require"; (4) sale of the debtor's interest in the
partnership.
The first of these steps-entry of the charging order-is unques-
tionably a condition precedent to any of the last three, although the
second step may, under the express language of the statute, be taken
simultaneously with the first. Probably the third and fourth steps also
can be taken at the time the charging order is issued.
Does the first step-the charging order-contemplate ony a lien
on the interest of the debtor partner, requiring one of the other steps
as an implementing measure, or may the charging order alone direct
the payment of the debt to be made by the partnership out of the
debtor partner's share? On principle there appears to be no reason
why the court in its charging order could not direct the members of
the partnership to pay the debtor partner's share in the profits or other
moneys as they fall due. Even if the charging order, technically de-
fined, would not include such a direction, it might be regarded as an
19531
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order "which the circumstances of the case may require" under the
third step listed above. A rather different view is indicated, however,
by Lord Justice Lindley in the leading English case of Brown, Hanson
& Co. v. Hutchinson & Co."8 quoted from at the beginning of this
article.".
In that case the distinguished jurist, after quoting the portion of the
English statute stating that a court could "make an order charging the
partner's interest," said:
What is the effect of that? That has no immediate effect on the co-part-
ners at all. It simply amounts to this-that the interest of their co-partner
in the business is charged just as if he had given an equitable charge over
his interest. It does not harass or affect the other partners in the least.' s
In substance then, it is Lord Lindley's view that the charging order,
standing alone, simply encumbers the interest but does not compel the
firm to do anything about paying the creditor. That result is accom-
plished, in Lord Lindley's view, by receivership as he immediately
indicates in the following language:
Then, in order to give effect to that charge, provision is made for the
appointment of a receiver for that partner's share and profits. The effect of
that is that the appointment of a receiver operates as an injunction against
the execution debtor receiving anything from his co-partners, and if his
co-partners pay over to him anything with knowledge of the appointment of
the receiver they may get into trouble.' 9
It thus seems clear that Lord Lindley was of the opinion that the
appointment of a receiver is indispensable to the collection of the
debtor partner's share of profits or other amounts payable. The validity
of this conclusion will presently be put in question.
Lord Lindley continues:
But then that (the appointment of a receiver) does not produce money,
except money which the co-partners may hand over, or could hand over
to the judgment debtor partner if it were not for the receiver. In order to
get the full benefit of the charge, the section proceeds: The Court may
direct all accounts and inquiries, and give all other orders and directions
which might have been directed or given if the charge had been in favour
of the judgment creditor by the partner, or which the circumstances of the
case may require. That means this-that an order may be made to take an
account of what is due from the co-partners to the judgment debtor partner,
and there is a clause (s. 33, sub-s. 2) which enables the solvent partners
16 1 Q.B. 737 (1895).
17 Ante, p. 1.
is 1 Q.B. 737 (1895).
19 1 Q.B. 737 (1895). The concluding part of this statement is the only language to
be found in the cases as to the sanctions which may be imposed on non-debtor partners
who disregard the charging order.
[FEB.
CHARGING ORDER UNDER PARTNERSHIP ACT
to treat that as a dissolution. There is a clause which enables the solvent
partners to proceed, if they think fit, to get rid of the judgment debtor.
That is the machinery provided.
This particular excerpt from Brown, Janson & Co. v. Hutchinson
& Co." is vague and, in part, inaccurate. Apparently the account to
which the judge refers would be only an informational aid to the
creditor. That would seem to be its purpose under both the English
and American acts. The right which the non-debtor partners have to
dissolve the partnership under Section 33 of the Engliss Act2 is not,
however, as Loid Lindley implies, based upon the taking of an account.
Rather, the non-debtor partners may dissolve the partnership at any
time after "any partner suffers his share of the partnership property
to be charged under this Act for his separate debt."22 Thus the issuance
of a charging order and not the taking of an account justifies dis-
solution by the non-debtor partners. Finally, the last sentence of
the foregoing quotation from Brown, Janson & Co. v. Hutchinson
& Co." suggests that the English Act contains no other procedures
than those reviewed although the judge has said absolutely nothing
concerning the possibility of a sale of the partnership interest indicated
by section 23, subsection 3 of the Act.2
The actual issue in Brown, Janson & Co. v. Hutchinson & Co.,2
was whether a charging order could be issued against the English
branch of a French partnership. The statements already quoted from
the opinion were not, strictly speaking, essential to the decision of that
question. They were made only by way of background to the decision
on the actual issue rather than as an attempted exposition of the pre-
cise and full scope and effect of the statute. These circumstances are
mentioned by way~of admonition. Otherwise, because of the scarcity
of other authority, the judge's eminence as an authority on partnership
law and the picturesqueness of his literary style, there is a tendency to
read things into the quoted language which are not there,26 or to take
too literally statements that are at variance with the statute.
Lord Lindley's rather categorical statements that the charging or-
der, in and of itself, has no effect upon the non-debtor partners and
201 Q.B. 737 (1895).21 Note 9, supra.
22 7 U.L.A. 259.
221 Q.B. 737 (1895).
24 7 U.L.A. 256.
25 1 Q.B. 737 (1895).28For example, see LINDLEY, PART=RSHIP, 433, note X (Tenth Ed.).
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must be implemented by a receivership is of doubtful accuracy when
considered in light of the actual language of the statute. The same
general observation may also apply to the suggestion that accounting
is a measure which follows receivership and in turn is followed by
dissolution. Actually the statute apparently contemplates a highly
flexible and elastic procedure under which the court may employ a
charging order, a receivership of the debtor partner's interest, a sale
of that interest, and a wide range of orders for accounting or for other
purposes "which the circumstances of the case may require.""7 Funda-
mentally, the act seems to proceed on the theory that the primary
method for satisfying the creditor's judgment shall be by means of an
order diverting the debtor partner's share of the profits to his creditor
in a manner somewhat like that used in garnishment proceedings."' If
this method is ineffectual there is another more drastic course of action
mentioned-a sale of the debtor's interest in the partnership. 9 The
other things provided for-appointment of a receiver and the taking
of accounts and the making of such orders as the "circumstances of
the case may require"-appear to be designed simply as aids to these
two basic methods of collecting. The use of these subsidiary aids to
the collecting process certainly should be regarded as permissive rather
than compulsory. There is no apparent necessity for the appointment
of a receiver, if effective collection would result from the mere issuance
of an order requiring the partners to pay directly to the creditor the
amounts which otherwise would go to the debtor partner. The receiver
in such a case would serve no useful function but would merely add to
the expense and complexity of the proceeding.
This broader concept of interpretation appears quite definitely to
have been the view of Professor William Draper Lewis, the principal
architect of the Uniform Act. Originally the drafting of the Act was
assigned to Dean Ames of the Harvard Law School. He died before
the task was completed and Professor Lewis of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School then took over and completed the job. In a
general survey of the Uniform Act, written in the year following its
approval by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
he explained the charging order procedure as follows:
27 U.P.A., § 28 (1), 7 U.L.A. 162; RCW 25.04.080 [REm. Supp. 1945 § 9975-67].
28 No doubt it would have been possible to have achieved the benefits of section 28
by an extension of the garnishment process. This procedure was adopted in Georgia,
note 8, supra. Georgia has not as yet adopted the Uniform Partnership Act.
29 U.P.A., § 28 (2), 7 U.L.A. 162; RCW 25.04.080 [Ram. Supp. § 9975-67].
[FEB.
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After the adoption of the Act, when a judgment is secured against a
partner by his separate creditor, all that a creditor will have to do is to
apply to the court which gave him the judgment, or any other court, to
issue an order on the other partners to pay him the profits which would
otherwise be paid to his debtor, or to make any further order which will
result in his securing the payment of his judgment without unduly inter-
fering with the rights of the remaining partners in partnership property.80
* Although this brief statement is of a most general character, it ac-
cords with the apparent meaning and intent of the statutory language.
Significantly it indicates no approval of the narrower language of
Brown, Janson & Co. v. Hutchinson8 which had been decided twenty
years earlier and must have been well known to Professor Lewis. 2
American case authority on the scope of the charging order remedy
is extremely meager. Many of the cases dealing with the charging order
statute involve attempts by the creditor to proceed by the outmoded
process of. execution. In such cases the charging order provisions are
referred to usually merely to demonstrate that they supersede the
former procedure. In the relatively few American cases where charging
orders have been granted, there has as yet been no occasion to consider
the problem exhaustively. In short, little if anything can be regarded
as conclusively established by the cases. However, meager as they
are, the decisions are of some value in indicating what has been and
can be done under the statute. Generally the cases appear to proceed
on the liberal philosophy of interpretation indicated by Professor
Lewis rather than by the apparently narrower views suggested by
Lord Lindley.
In Frankil v. Frankil,88 the debtor partner conceded that "the plain-
tiff has a right to a charging order,' but contends that the plaintiff is
not entitled to an order on the sheriff to sell the right, title and interest
of the defendant in the partnership." In support of this position, the
defendant quoted the language of Professor Lewis set forth above.
It will be recalled that Professor Lewis did not there mention the
possibility of selling the debtor partner's interest. The court, how-
ever, did not feel that Professor Lewis' omission of any mention of a
sale was significant. The court discusses the statutory language which
does mention, in a somewhat left-handed way, a possible sale of the
debtor's interest, saying:
80 24 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 634 (1915).81 Supra, Note 1.8 2 However, the Commissioners' Note to Section 28 contains no reference to Brown,
Janson & Co. v. Hutchinson & Co., 7 U.L.A., p. 163.8815 Pa. Dist. & Cy. Rep. 103 (1931).
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The defendant, however, fails to recite subsection two of section twenty-
eight, which provides several methods of redeeming the interest charged
at any time before foreclosure, or in case of a sale being directed by the
court.... This part of section twenty-eight is meaningless unless it is con-
strued as conferring upon the court the right to direct a sale. Subsection
one, moreover, gives the court making the charging order the right to make
all other orders . . .which the circumstances of the case may require.
There, therefore can be no doubt but that the court has the right to order
the sheriff to sell the interest charged.34
The court also had similarly construed the general grant of power
contained in the statute when it said that it could "make any further
order which will result in his (the creditor's) securing the payment of
his judgment without unduly interfering with the rights of the remain-
ing partners in the partnership property."
The court in the Frankil case"5 concluded by holding that "the rule
for the charging order is made absolute" 6 and that an order be issued
directing that the sheriff sell the debtor partner's interest.
The most thorough survey of the property concepts of the Uniform
Partnership Act as they bear on section 28 is found in Windom Na-
tion Bank v. Klein. 7 There the court had entered "an order charging
their (the debtor's) interest in the firm with payment of the judgment
debt." The plaintiff was the receiver appointed pursuant to section 28.
He brought the action to set aside certain chattel mortgages placed
upon partnership property by the debtor partners to secure other
separate debts owing from them. The court reviewed all of the property
sections of the Uniform Act" to show that they establish an entity
concept under which no partner has an assignable interest in partner-
ship property and that the true separate interest of a partner is his
interest in the partnership business. The court accordingly held that
the chattel mortgages on partnership property were void. On the rights
of a receiver appointed under the charging order provisions of section
18, the court said:
It follows that a receiver .. .of a partner's 'share of the profits' acting
under a charging order and section 28... has the right in a proper action
to have adjudicated the nullity of any mortgage or other assignment by
3 Note 33, supra.
31 Note 33, supra.
36 The Pennsylvania equivalent of a show cause proceeding in Washington.
37 191 Minn. 447, 254 N.W. 602 (1934).
8 U.P.A. §§ 24 to 28; RCW 25.04.240 to 25.04.280 [REm. Supp. 1945 § 9975-63 to
9975-67].
[FEB.
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some but not all of the partners of their interest in specific property of the
partnership less than the whole. Such a receiver is entitled to any relief
under the language of the statute 'which the circumstances of the case may
require' to accomplish justice under the law. Obviously, a part of such
relief is the avoidance of any unauthorized attempts to dispose of partner-
ship property. Such a receiver is entitled to the 'share of the profits and sur-
plus' (section 26 . . .) of the partner who happens to be the judgment
debtor. While he is not entitled to share in the management of the firm
as a partner, the receiver would be of little use if he could not protect
'profits and surplus' by preventing such unauthorized and illegal dissipa-
tions of firm assets as the complaint alleges in this case. While the pro-
cedure for his appointmerit is statutory, the language of the law is so broad
that, when it comes to a question of the relief needed by such a receiver,
the usual broad principles of equity jurisprudence ought to control. Hence
a receiver of the interest of one partner is entitled to any relief needed to
conserve all partnership property for the payment so far as necessary of
the partnership creditors. Judicial aid may become necessary even to insure
to a partner or his receiver his share of the profits, either from the going
business or upon its dissolution. Such are the purposes of the statute. They
are not to be frustrated by any construction which will deny it its intended
scope.
While the precise issue dealt with concerned only the right of the
receiver to attack the chattel mortgages, the Minnesota court thuq
makes it clear that the broad language of the statute is to be liberally
construed to achieve the purpose of the statute. Of interest also is the
court's statement that a receiver does not become a partner or partici-
pate in the management and that he would be of little use if he did not
have some other functions than the mere receipt of the debtor partner's
share of the profits and surplus.
-In the Oregon decision of Scott v. Platt"9 the creditor of a partner
first proceeded by execution and garnishment. Later, and after the
debtor was adjudicated bankrupt, the creditor applied for a charging
order. In order to avoid the effects of .the intervening bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, the creditor: contended that the execution and garnishment
proceedings effected a lien which he was entitled to foreclose by the
charging order procedure. This contention, tenuous at best, was re-
jected because it in fact appeared that the creditor had abandoned the
execution and garnishment proceedings. The case thus actually decides
nothing more than this lack of factual connection between the pre-
bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy proceedings. Nevertheless, the court
39 177 Ore. 515, 163 P. 2d 293 (1945).
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considered the provisions of the Uniform Act and made the following
comment:
As will be observed from the review of the pleadings ... , this proceed-
ing is based upon . . . section 28 of the Uniform Act. . . . It specifies a
simple, effective method whereby a judgment creditor may have the latter's
interest in the partnership applied upon the judgment debt. The operation
of (section 28) is not dependent upon whether or not a writ of execution,
a notice of garnishment or any like process has been procured. Whether
the judgment creditor obtained the issuance of a writ of execution or had
a notice of garnishment served upon someone is wholly immaterial to
(section 28). The procedure inaugurated by that section of our laws is
not in aid of execution, attachment or garnishment; nor does it constitute
a means by which a lien may be foreclosed.
In Wyoming National Bank v. Bennett"0 the court refused to grant
a charging order where the partnership business had been changed to
corporate ownership and operation long before plaintiff's judgment
was obtained. The court, however, said:
A receiver appointed under this act would not have the usual powers of a
receiver, possessing the rights of the insolvent for the purpose of adminis-
tering his estate for the benefit of creditors under the direction of the Court.
His right under this Act is not to administer but simply receive the share
of the insolvent partner in the profits of the concern.41
The four preceding cases are the only American decisions which
cast any real light upon the substance and scope of the charging order
procedure. The other decisions which deal with Section 28 of the Act
do no more than quote the statutory language verbatim or paraphrase
it in terms so general as to add nothing.2 Out of the small total of
40 32 Luzerne Leg. Reg. Rep. 371 (Pa. 1938).
41 The limited nature of the receiver's rights and, particularly, his inability to par-
ticipate in or assume the management of the business is also recognized in Brown,
Janson & Co. v. Hutchison & Co., note 1, supra, and Windom National Bank v. Klein,
note 37, supra.
42 In the following cases the creditor proceeded by execution against partnership
property after the adoption of the Uniform Act and the court cited or quoted from
Section 28 of the Act to show that execution is not only forbidden by Section 25 but
superseded by the charging order procedure of Section 28: Sherwood v. Jackson, 121
Cal. App. 354, 8 P. 2d 943 (1932) ; Rader v. Goldoff, 223 App. Div. 455, 228 N.Y.S.
453 (1928); Northeastern Real Estate Securities Corp. v. Goldstein, 267 App. Div.
832, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 848 (1944). In Dalinda v. Abegg, 175 Misc. 945, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 612(1941) the same two sections of the Uniform Act were relied on to defeat an attach-
ment of specific partnership property for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction in rem
as to a non-resident debtor partner. In Townsend v. L. J. Appel Sons, 164 Md. 255,
164 AtI. 679 (1933) and in Metropolitan Casualty Co. v. Cimino, 108 N.J. Law 243,
157 At. 152 (1931) executions were defeated on the authority of Section 25 (c) alone
without mention of Section 28. In Ribero v. Callaway, 87 Cal. App. 2d 135, 196 P. 2d
109 (1948) and Cameron v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 2d 597, 199 P. 2d 450 (1948),
potentially interesting problems were not decided for collateral reasons. In the Ribero
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decision and dictum in -the four cases, we find one case, decided by an
inferior court of Pennsylvania, holding that the sheriff may be ordered
to sell the interest of the debtor partner;' 8 two cases favoring a liberal
interpretation of the broad language of the statute;" two cases dis-
cussing the functions of a receiver under the statute;". one case hold-
ing the receiver can sue to set aside the void assignment of a partner-
ship asset" and one case declaring that the charging order procedure
is entirely independent of execution, attachment or garnishment 7
In addition there are two more cases" which, while not expounding
the substance of the charging order procedure, hold that it may be
used to attack a dissolution of the partnership attempted for the pur-
pose of defeating the creditor's claim.
In the somewhat doubtful state of the law,' the following proposi-
case, the non-debtor partners opposed a sale of the debtor's interest. The court held
that only the debtor partner, who had not appealed, could raise this question. In the
Cameron case, the trial court had granted a charging order and "an order foreclosing
the charging order and directing a sale" of the debtor's interest. The creditor's judg-
ment was reversed on appeal, causing automatic destruction of the charging order
process. In DeMartini v. Industrial Accident Commission, 90 Cal. App. 2d 139, 202
P. 2d 828 (1949), no problem of creditor's rights was involved but the property sec-
tions of the Uniform Act, including those pertaining to the charging order process,
were discussed to show the existence of an entity concept in this phase of partnership
law.
48 Franldl v. Frankil, note 32, supra; see also R.ibero .v. Callaway, note 42, su~pra,
and Cameron v. Superior Court, note 42, supra, for instances in which sales were
ordered by trial courts but propriety thereof was not ruled on by appellate court.
"4-Franldl v. Franldi, note 32, supra, and Windom National Bank v. Klein, note
37, supra.
,5 Windom National Bank v. Klein, note 37, supra, and Wyoming National Bank
v. Bennett, note 40, supra.
46 Windom National Bank v. Klein, note 37, supra.
47 Scott v. Platt, note 39, supra.
48 Spitzen v. Buten, 306 Pa. 556, 160 At. 444 (1932) and First National Bank of
Charleston v. White, 268 Ill. App. 414 (1932). The essential problem in both cases
appears to be in the field of fraudulent conveyances. The Pennsylvania court remanded
the case with a recommendation that fraud be alleged and the proceeding carried for-
ward on principles expressed in Section 41 (9) of the Uniform Partnership Act. The
Illinois court held the dissolution invalid because it occurred after the entry of judg-
ment and issuance of an unsatisfied execution thereon. The partnership act is most
liberally and questionably interpreted to make the charging order effective as of the
earlier date of the unsatisfied execution. Perhaps a better procedure would be the type
of adversary procedure indicated by Windom National Bank v. Klein, note 37, supra.
An English decision dealing with a similar problem is Edmondson v. Harrison, 41
Sol. Jour. 128 (1896).
,9 No substantial aid to specific interpretations 6f the statute is obtained from the
texts or other non-judicial literature. See CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 43 (Second Ed.,
1952) ; LiNDLEY, PARTNESHIP, 431 to 435 (Tenth Ed.); BunR~cx, PARTNERsip,
269 to 280 (Third Ed., 1917) ; 27 COL. L. Ray., 436; 5 TEPi.E LA W QuARmTLy, 278.
The hazard of positive predictions is indicated by the last of these articles in which
the author rather dogmatically stated, on the somewhat questionable authority of
Brown, Janson & Co. v. Hutchinson & Co., note 1, supra, that a sale of the partnership
interest would probably be ordered only where the business of the partnership business
was being conducted at a loss. Almost contemporaneously with the publication of this
law review article, the decision in Frankil v. Franldl, note 32, .supra, also appeared in.
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tions seem to accord best with the language and purpose of the statute
and the philosophy of the American courts with respect thereto.
First, the charging order may enjoin the members of the partner-
ship from making further disbursements of any kind to the debtor
partner, except such payments as may be permissible under a legal
exemption right properly asserted by the debtor.
Second, the charging order may formally require the members of the
partnership to pay to the creditor any amounts which it would other-
wise pay to the debtor partner, exclusive of any amounts payable to
the latter under a properly asserted legal exemption right.
Third, the appointment of a receiver is not indispensable to the col-
lection of the claim out of the debtor partner's share. A receiver should
be appointed only where he has some useful function to serve such as
the maintenance of a lawsuit,5" the conduct of a sale or the representa-
tion of competing creditors of the debtor partner. It may be that even
in such a case, no receiver is necessary since there is no insuperable
reason why these services cannot be obtained by some other method.
Certainly the court should not appoint a receiver where he would serve
no useful purpose while adding to the expense of the proceeding.
Fourth, the debtor's interest should be sold if, and only if, the court
is convinced that the creditor's claim will not be satisfied with reason-
able expedition by the less drastic process of diverting the debtor's
income from the partnership to the payment of the debt." Even in the
case of a wholly solvent partnership, the creditor's claim may be so
large in relation to the current income of the debtor from the firm as
to require sale as the only alternative to long delay in payment.
Fifth, the courts should liberally employ the general language of the
act concerning "orders, directions, accounts and inquiries . . . which
the circumstances of the case may require." By this means information
as to the nature and extent of the debtor's interest in the partnership
can be obtained and the whole range of unusual problems which are
bound to arise may be dealt with as the occasion demands. Included in
this general power should be the power to prescribe the manner in
Pennsylvania and directed a sale of the interest without any suggestion of such limited
availability of the remedy.
50 See Windom National Bank v. Klein, note 37, supra.
5 There is actually no authority whatsoever as to when a sale should be ordered.
Necessarily the order must fall in the area of those "which the circumstances of the
case require." The apparent situations in which sale would be necessary are those in
which, owing to the size of the claim or the absence of current liquid income, an order
to pay over the debtor partner's share of current income and other moneys would not
be effective.
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which a sale of the partnership interest is to be made. 2
One other question prominently posed by both the English and
American statutes and not touched upon by any decision in either
country since the adoption of the respective acts goes to the rights of
a non-debtor partner who redeems or purchases the interest of a debtor
partner. Both statutes expressly recognize the right to redeem and, in
the event of a sale being ordered, the right to purchase at the sale. The
American statute is somewhat more detailed, specifying that the right
to redeem exists "before foreclosure." ' and that a purchase or redemp-
tion may be made with separate property of the redemptioner or, if
all of the non-debtor partners consent, with partnership property. Both
statutes present the question whether a non-debtor partner who re-
deems or purchases thereby acquires the interest of the debtor partner
free and clear of the latter's claim or in trust for him.
Considering the statute only, a possible distinction between the
redemption and purchase situations can be urged. The price realized
on a competitive sale theoretically represents the full value of the
thing sold, although in practice this ideal result is seldom achieved.
Upon a redemption before sale, however, there is'not even a theoretical
logical connection between the redemption price and the value of the
redeemed interest. Normally the* redemption price would be the amount
of the creditor's claim and any identity between the a -mount of the
claim and the value of the interest would be merely a coincidence.
Under these circumstances it might be maintained with some force
that the non-debtor partners who purchase at a sale held under the
statute acquire the debtor partner's interest absolutely" whereas the
non-debtor partner who redeems has merely advanced moneys for the
52 The statute is utterly silent as to the procedure to be followed in making a sale.
In Frankil v. Frankil, note 32, supra, the court directed'that the sale be made by the
sheriff. Whether that official can be called on to make judicial sales in the absence of
a special statutory provision is questionable. Unless the receiver contemplated by
Section 28 is to be regarded as limited to the express duties mentioned in the statute,
the logical procedure would be for him to conduct the sale on such notice and terms as
the court might fix. As to the plenary power of a court' to prescribe the terms of a
receiver's sale in the absence of explicit statutory requirements, see Yakima Finance
Corp. v. Thompson, 171 Wash. 309, 17 P. 2d 908 (1933); Chapman v. Schiller, 95
Utah 514, 83 P. 2d 239 (1938).
58 No definition of these words appears elsewhere in the Act or in the cases decided
thereunder. Doubtless the language would mean before sale or before the expiration of
a redemption period fixed by the court in its order of sale. There appears to be no un-
qualified right to' a redemption period extending after sale, the matter being controlled
by the court's discretion. See Chapman v. Schiller, note 52, Supra.
54Upon this theory, it would be immaterial whether separate or partnership funds
were used by the non-debtor partners. The debtor would have received the full value
of his interest in either event.
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bnefit of the debtor and holds the interest in trust for him. The theory
would be that, in the former situation, the debtor's interest is entirely
represented by the purchase money while, in the latter case, the value
of the interest and its relation to the redemption price can be de-
termined only by an accounting.
More likely, however, the courts would in all cases invoke principles
of fiduciary relationship which are so deeply rooted in the law of part-
nership and would in every instance require the non-debtor partners
to account for the full value of the debtor partner's interest, less the
amount paid by way of redemption or purchase. Such a view was most
emphatically advanced in two cases" which arose in England under
the old procedure prior to the Partnership Act. While both of these
cases contained substantial evidence of bad faith on the part of the
non-debtor partners, the scope and force of the fiduciary doctrine is
such that bad faith would not seem essential to the debtor partner's
case against his associates."'
PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING CHARGING ORDER
The statute, as already noted, contains only a very general descrip-
tion of the procedure to be followed in getting a charging order. It
requires (a) that the applicant be a judgment creditor and (b) that
he apply to a "competent court" which may be "the court which en-
tered the judgment ... or any other court." This identification of the
appropriate court is somewhat ambiguous and will necessarily vary
from state to state."' As applied to the judicial system of the state of
Washington, the natural assumption is that the "competent court" is
the Superior Court as the only state trial court of general jurisdiction.
However, the specific provision giving the right to the "court which
entered the judgment" would appear to empower the Justice Courts to
issue charging orders where the judgments are entered in such courts.
The "any other court" language is somewhat puzzling. It can scarcely
be taken so literally as to empower any court, regardless of its normal
functions, to act. A possible conclusion is that the language was in-
tended only to permit courts of general jurisdiction in other portions
of the state to act, as for example, to permit the Superior Court for
Spokane County to issue a charging order on the strength of a judg-
ment rendered by the Superior Court of King County or by a Justice
55 Prens v. Johnson, 3 Sm. & G. 419 (1857) ; Helmore v. Smith, 35 Ch. Div. 436(1887).
56 Note 55, supra; Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
5 7 The English Act specifies the appropriate English courts by name.
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Court in King County. It must be confessed, however, that. the precise
meaning of this portion of the statute is open to argument. We have
here an example of the dangers inherent in using general procedural
language in Uniform Acts.5 Since there are- no Washington decisions
construing any portion of section 28, the question of court jurisdiction
in unusual situations is wide open in this state.
Another question is as to what constitutes "due application" under
the statute. The charging order procedure is for the purpose of enforc-
ing a judgment in a case which, normally, the sole parties are debtor
partner and his judgment creditor. The charging order procedure, how-
ever, necessarily contemplates some. disturbance of the relationship
between the debtor partner and the non-debtor partners although the
statute is designed to keep that disturbance at a minimum..It certainly
is necessary to give the non-debtor partners notice of the application if
they are to be required to withhold the debtor partner's profits from
him and pay them over to the creditor.
Insofar as any procedure can be said to have developed in other
states, the practice appears to be for the judgment creditor to obtain
an order to show cause directed to all of the partners requiring theni
to appear at a time certain in opposition to the charging order, if they
so desire. Service is then effected on all of the'partners. The non-debtor
partners are thus brought into the primary proceeding for the first
time much like a garnishee defendant on a writ of garnishment, issued
after judgment. This show cause procedure, conventionally followed
in other states, is used in this state in comparable siuations and appears
well adapted to the procedural aspects of the charging order statute.
However, comparison of the very general language of section 28 with
the detailed statutory and court rule material covering conventional
attachments, executions and garnishments suggests the desirability of
some definite procedural implementation of section 28.
Is THE CHARGING ORDER PR OcEDURE THE ExcLusWE REMEDY
The statute makes it perfectly clear that the charging order super-
sedes the former procedure of attachment of or execution against the
partnership property by expressly forbidding both such attachments
and executions." However, since the act does not specifically say that
a partner's interest in the partnership cannot be taken on attachment
58 Modem uniform acts usually leave name of court in blank to be supplied by the
local legislature.
50 U.P.A., § 25 (2) C).
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or execution, courts in a few cases have suggested the possibility of
employing an attachment or execution of the intangible interest as an
alternative to the charging order procedure."0 Such a question assumes
of necessity that the local attachment and execution statute either
expressly or by judicial interpretation will permit the use of these
procedures to reach an intangible interest such as that held by a
partner."'
In all probability, courts will be disposed to hold that section 28 of
the Act supersedes any right to levy execution under an earlier statute. 2
The charging order statute appears to occupy fully the field of satis-
faction of the claims of judgment creditors against a partner's interest
and thus to constitute a repeal by implication of any previous pro-
cedures designed to accomplish the same result.
A somewhat different situation exists as to attachments. Section 28
does not concern itself with any sort of procedure prior to judgment.
If attachment of the debtor partner's interest prior to judgment cannot
be had, there appears to be no method by which a creditor who insti-
tutes suit can be assured that the partnership interest will be available
for him when he gets his judgment. In this light there is a practical
argument in favor of continuing an existing right under the attachment
statute and there is no clear design in the Act to repeal such a right.
If it be assumed that the attachment statute permitted a seizure of a
partner's intangible interest before the Uniform Partnership Act, a
repeal by implication could be supported only on the theory that it
is the policy of Section 28 to limit enforcement proceedings to the
period after judgment. This proposition is questionable in view of the
basic concept that repeals by implication are not favored.
It is most probable that in most instances the right to attach a part-
ner's interest would be denied on an historical basis. Prior to the Uni-
form Partnership Act creditors did not attach intangible interests of
debtor partners. They attached physical property of the firm. This
procedure was expressly repealed by Section 25 (c) of the Uniform Act.
Consequently it is doubtful if a court would now discover that a prior
attachment statute now permits attachment of the partner's intangible
60 Northampton Brewery Corp. v. Lande, 133 Pa. Super. 181, 2 A. 2d 553 (1938) ;
Dalinda v. Abegg, 175 Misc. 945, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 612 (1941) ; Scott v. Platt, 177 Ore.
515, 163 P. 2d 293 (1945).
61 In Washington a rather liberal interpretation of execution statutes applies as to
intangible property. See Johnson v. Dahlquist, 130 Wash. 29, 225 Pac. 817 (1924).
62 In Bressler v. Averbuck, 322 Mass. 139, 76 N.E. 2d 146 (1947), the pre-U.P.A.
statute was employed. The Uniform Act is not mentioned and may have been over-
looked by court and counsel.
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interest where such a power, although theoretically present, was never
recognized before the adoption of the Act.
In considering the exclusiveness of the Uniform At, it should be
remembered that the Act only purports to cover the claims of conven-
tional judgment creditors. There are of course unusual situations
where it is important to reach the interest of a partner in the partner-
ship for the benefit of one who is not a creditor in the strict sense, as,
for example, to enforce the claim of a wife for support. The courts in
such cases can and do draw upon other powers to reach the partner-
ship interest.68
CONCLUSION
Although the Uniform Act is not perfect in the respects here dis-
cussed, it is a substantial improvement over the awkward and illogical
common law procedure. Despite the many apparent deficiencies of
section 28 and its procedural vagueness, no strong movement has
developed to change the basic design of the charging order procedure.
It would doubtless simplify the task of the practitioner if the pro-
cedural steps were formalized by statute or court rule. Until that is
done, the ingenuity of courts and lawyers will no doubt provide.work-
able means to accomplish the objective of the statute. Once the essen-
tial nature of the problem is recognized, that is, that the proceeding
is one to subject an intangible interest in a business rather than a
direct interest in the property of the business to the satisfaction of the
creditor's claim, the working out of details of procedure should not
be too difficult.
68 Luick v. Luicl, 163 Pa. Super. 378, 64 A. 2d 860 (1949), proceeding by a wife
to get support from partnership interest of deserting husband; Rankin v. Culver, 303
Pa. 401, 154 AtI. 701 (1931), use of a "foreign attachment," essentially a sort of con-
tinuing garnishment under the Pennsylvania statute, to get jurisdiction in rem over a
non-resident debtor. The U.P.A. is not mentioned in this case. But see Dalinda v.
Abegg, 175 Misc. 945, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 612 (1941).
